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ABSTRACT 
 
 Owners of modest-sized, recreation-oriented ranch properties, known as 
“ranchettes,” appear to judge a key characteristic of the quality of their properties, the 
extent of vegetative “greenness,” based on their own observation, despite the greater 
reliability of publicly available climate data.  The discrepancy between personal 
observation and public data is perceived erroneously by owners as reflecting an 
information asymmetry that favors the former.  The consequence of this 
misperception is adverse selection: transplant owners, who are not familiar with long-
term local weather patterns from direct observation, delay the sale of properties that 
are greener during their term of ownership.  Econometric evidence is presented from 
the analysis of 694 ranchette sales in Yavapai County, Arizona during 1991-2000.  
The results demonstrate that the efficiency of the market mechanism is affected not 
just by the actual distribution of information on quality, but by its perceived 
distribution. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the archetypal desert B-movie, a traveler on foot, having drunk the last drop 
of water from his canteen, comes across what appears to be an oasis in the distance.  
Excitedly, he changes his course and travels miles in the wrong direction only to find, 
when he arrives where the water is supposed to be, that there is nothing there but sand.  
An attended phenomenon (a mirage) has led to an erroneous interpretation of reality 
(there must be water there), which in turn results in a suboptimal decision (to travel 
miles off-course). 
 
And so, it may be with economic decisions.  This paper demonstrates how 
erroneously perceived information may lead to an incorrect economic 
characterization of a market situation and, consequently, suboptimal economic 
behavior and outcomes.  Our evidence is from the market for recreational ranch 
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properties, known as“ranchettes,” in Yavapai County, Arizona.  Ranchettes consist 
of modest-sized parcels, often created by subdividing larger farms and ranches.  
They typically host nominal agricultural operations but are not operated for profit.  
Inputs are purchased with non-farm income rather than revenues from agricultural 
sales (Sengupta & Osgood, 2003). 
 
For such properties in Yavapai County, the presence of green vegetation has 
been shown to be an important determinant of real estate value (Sengupta & Osgood, 
2003).  The long-term trend in “greenness” of a parcel is determined by its rainfall, so 
it is possible for anyone with access to historic climate data for the locality to assess a 
parcel’s long-term greenness with the same accuracy as its owner.  Yet, ranchette 
owners who originally come from out of state do not appear to act as if greenness 
were subject to full information.  Rather, consistent with the findings of psychological 
research, out-of-state owners appear to judge a property’s greenness based on what 
they see while they own it, placing weight on their own limited observations of the 
property despite the greater reliability of the full span of publicly available data.  The 
discrepancy between personal observation and public data is judged erroneously by 
owners as reflecting an information asymmetry that favors the former.  As we show 
empirically, this perception of asymmetric information leads to an adverse selection 
(i.e., “lemons”) outcome: out-of-state owners delay the sale of properties that are 
greener during their term of ownership. 
 
A number of empirical studies have found evidence of adverse selection in 
markets with actual asymmetric information (e.g., Genesove, 1993; Chezum & 
Wimmer, 1996; Dewan & Hsu, 2004; Ghose, 2005).  To our knowledge, the present 
study is the first to present evidence of adverse selection based on an illusion of 
asymmetric information in a market exhibiting full information. 
 
Relevant to the present paper are a number of studies that have looked at 
determinants of the duration of ownership or marketing/selling time of real estate 
(Haurin, 1988; Glower et al., 1998; Genesove & Mayer, 2001; Engelhardt, 2003; 
Levitt & Syverson, 2005).  Perhaps the most closely related work in this vein is by 
Sirmans et al. (1995), who examine the effect of seller misinformation on selling time.  
In their framework, a seller develops a “stopping rule,” indicating under what 
conditions she will accept an offer to buy, based on her expectations as to the 
distribution of bids.  The authors find that sellers who underestimate the distribution 
of bids sell too quickly.  Along similar lines, we find that sellers who erroneously rely 
on directly experienced quality information mistime the sale of their properties. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 elaborates on our 
hypothesis, drawing on the economic literature on asymmetric information and the 
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psychological literatures on availability and directly experienced evidence.  Section 3 
describes our data and empirical methodology for testing the hypothesis.  Section 4 
presents the empirical results.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
II. DIRECT EXPERIENCE AND PERCEPTIONS OF ASYMMETRIC 
INFORMATION 
 
In his famous “lemons” paper, Akerlof (1970) demonstrates that low-quality 
goods may drive high-quality goods from a market when there are information 
asymmetries.  Specifically, if the buyer is unable to observe product quality at the 
time of the transaction, prices offered will reflect the average quality of goods rather 
than their actual quality.  Sellers of higher-than-average quality products consequently 
have insufficient incentives to offer them for sale.  Only low-quality goods remain in 
the market, despite potential gains from trade accruing to the offer of high-quality 
goods. 
 
The market described by Akerlof (1970) involves centralized trade.  That is, a 
large number of agents exist on both sides of the market, and all agents have 
simultaneous access to the same trading opportunities.  Therefore, a single price must 
prevail.  In contrast, Blouin (2003) considers the problems of asymmetric information 
and adverse selection when trade is decentralized, that is, when a market is made by 
the random matching of agents in pairs.  Such a situation may describe the market for 
real estate and online secondary goods markets, among other contexts.  Blouin (2003) 
finds that transactions need not occur at the same price, and that price and time are 
both adjustment mechanisms.  Consequently, sellers face a tradeoff between making a 
quick sale and obtaining a high price, which high-quality sellers resolve by setting a 
higher-than-average price and waiting longer on the market.  In the end, all goods are 
offered, but high-quality goods sell with a delay.1 
 
Empirical analysis of asymmetric information and adverse selection in 
decentralized markets has been limited thus far.  In an analysis of the electronic 
secondary market hosted by Amazon, Ghose (2005) finds that high-quality goods wait 
longer on the market than other goods, corroborating the recent theory. 
 
 With full information, one would expect such lemons results to vanish.  Quality 
would not be expected to affect the likelihood or timing of sale if all people had the 
same unimpaired ability to evaluate it.  Psychological evidence suggests, however, 
that people exhibit judgmental biases, some of which appear relevant to evaluating 
 
1 Janssen & Karamychev (2002) and Janssen & Roy (2004) obtain similar results under centralized trade with the 
assumption that goods are durable. 
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product quality.  Tversky & Kahneman (1973) observe that individuals make 
judgments relating to frequency and probability based on a heuristic approach called 
availability.  Specifically, the frequency of classes of phenomena or the probability of 
events is judged based on how easily relevant instances are brought to mind.  A 
number of studies provide evidence of the application of the availability heuristic in 
common situations involving judgment.  For example, consumers have been found to 
base both their tendency to believe advertising messages and affective disposition 
toward products on availability (Lee & Labroo, 2004; Escalas, 2004).  Meanwhile, 
Bukszar (1999) finds that availability influences the manner in which managers in 
organizations make sense of past events and draw “lessons learned” that affect future 
business strategies. 
 
 Related to availability is the notion that individuals give greater weight to vivid 
or directly experienced evidence in making inferences than pallid information (Nesbitt 
& Ross, 1980).  This occurs even in cases in which such information should be given 
virtually no weight in the face of more pertinent statistical data (Rabin, 1998).  The 
phrases “seeing is believing” and “go and see for yourself” reflect the importance of 
direct experience in the formation of judgments.  Vivid evidence has been shown to 
affect judgment both through its increased availability in memory and also directly, 
without mediation by memory (Shedler & Manis, 1986). 
 
 Evidence of the effect of vivid and directly experienced information on attitude 
change is largely anecdotal, and most experimental studies do not support a 
connection (Taylor & Thompson, 1982).  However, experimental evidence does 
support the notion that direct experience of an event leads to stronger judgments 
(Walster, 1966) and causes people to be more likely to act based on their judgments 
(Regan & Fazio, 1977).  And Taylor & Thompson (1982) concede that direct 
experience may well have a strong impact on the acquisition of attitudes, albeit not 
their alteration. 
 
 The judgmental biases attributable to availability (and direct experience, to the 
extent that it affects judgment through availability) relate to the principle of sampling.  
People do not have the time or effort to conduct an exhaustive search of all cases in 
making a judgment, so instead they create a mental sample of the evidence.  The 
trouble is that the most mentally available cases, which are most likely to make up the 
sample, may not be random or unbiased.  This is because not all instances will be 
represented in memory or represented where they may be easily retrieved.  Therefore, 
the sample will not be truly representative of the population of information (Sherman 
& Corty, 1984). 
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 Let us consider how the psychological research findings just discussed relate to 
the market for ranchettes.  As discussed in the introduction, a key characteristic of 
product quality with respect to ranchette properties is the greenness of the land, which 
is determined by the local rainfall.  To predict how much rainfall a property will get 
typically, one can look at publicly available climate data.  Thus, there is information 
on greenness available to all interested parties.  However, psychological evidence 
suggests that people might overweight their own observations of greenness for a 
parcel relative to the public information.  That is, they would rely on what they “saw 
for themselves” in preference to what was learned from pallid, historic data on the 
locality. 
 
 For long-term residents of the local area, this would not pose a problem.  
Observations from personal experience converge to the historic weather series as 
one’s tenure in a region grows longer.  Someone living in Yavapai County for long 
enough – say, 10 years or more – will have a set of personally-recalled weather 
experiences that approximate the historic data well.  However, a landowner who has 
been in the area for a shorter period (e.g., a non-native Arizonan, buying for the first 
time in the state) would develop a sense of the greenness of her parcel that does not 
approximate its historic greenness.  Thus, the out-of-state owner’s assessment would 
tend to be biased. 
 
 How will a ranchette owner interpret her assessment of greenness in making 
decisions regarding the terms of sale, and what will be the effects of her 
interpretation?  Our maintained hypothesis is that owners generally will interpret 
directly experienced evidence as superior information.  Thus, they will consider 
themselves better informed than buyers about the greenness of their property.  Since, 
in this context, owners form quality inferences that cannot be transmitted credibly to 
buyers, adverse selection should result just as it would in a market with true 
asymmetric information. 
 
 Let us examine how this plays out in a decentralized market, such as the market 
for ranchettes.  As discussed above, sellers in decentralized markets face a tradeoff 
between making a quick sale and obtaining a high price (Blouin, 2003).  Thus, the 
seller’s decision may be diagrammed as involving indifference curves and a 
possibilities frontier in price/time space, as shown in Fig. 1.  Though such a tradeoff 
always exists in a dynamic market with time discounting, it is particularly pronounced 
in the case of asymmetric information.  The logic, provided by Blouin (2003), goes as 
follows.  Asymmetric information results in low-quality products selling initially 
while high-quality products wait.  The quality of the product pool therefore improves 
as time passes; buyers recognize this improvement, so prices rise over time. 
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An out-of-state owner perceiving asymmetric information expects the shift in 
average quality described by Blouin (2003) and the associated upward evolution in 
prices.  This manifests as the expanded possibilities frontier, PF’.  The owner who 
perceives she has a high-quality good therefore waits longer: instead of selling for p* 
at time t*, she waits to sell at , expecting to receive price p’ and reach indifference 
curve IC’ rather than IC.2  Thus, seller behavior is consistent with Blouin’s adverse 
selection scenario. 
 
This analysis yields the following hypothesis concerning seller conduct: 
 
HYPOTHESIS: The greener the property during the term of ownership for an 
out-of-state seller, holding historic greenness constant, the longer the seller 
will hold the property. 
 
Such conduct turns out to have adverse consequences for the seller’s own 
welfare.  Since properties held longer by out-of-state owners are actually not higher 
quality (they just looked greener to their owners), product pool quality does not 
improve over time.  So, the price the seller can receive by waiting is not as great as 
expected, as reflected by the true possibilities frontier, PF, being inside the seller’s 
 
2 By contrast, a low-quality seller would have steeper indifference curves, reflecting a greater relative preference for 
quick sale over high price, and would therefore sell sooner. 
Dt
Less time
Higher
price
PF’
PF
IC
IC’
tD t*
p*
pD
Fig.1  Seller’s price-time tradeoff
p’
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expected frontier, PF’, in the upper region.  At a certain point – perhaps at time  – 
the out-of-state owner realizes the true position of the possibilities frontier.  She then 
sells at the best price the market will bear, .  The net result is suboptimal for the 
seller, since she could have done better for herself with a different point on the 
frontier. 
 
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
To test the hypothesis above, we perform an empirical analysis of the 
determinants of duration of ranchette ownership in Yavapai County.  Our regression 
model posits duration of ownership as a function of mortgage rates, owner 
characteristics, perceived and actual property characteristics, and interactions between 
owner and property characteristics.  To wit: 
 
  
 
Data on real estate sales between 1991 and 2000 in Yavapai County were provided 
by the Yavapai County assessor’s office.  The dataset included sale dates, assessed 
value of improvements to properties, and the names and mailing addresses of 
purchasers.  A ranchette is defined as a parcel of land between 2 and 40 acres.3  
Approximately 70,000 sales of such parcels occurred in the county during the sample 
period.  Out of these, about 1000 repeat sales pairs were recorded, reflecting parcels 
that changed hands two or more times.  Some 694 repeat sales pairs – those remaining 
after outliers and bad data were purged – form our sample for analysis.  The 
dependent variable for the regression model is defined as the log of the time between 
the sales pairs, that is, the duration of ownership (in days) for the person owning the 
property following the first sale. 
 
Several explanatory variables in the regression are based on statistics relating to 
the greenness of the property.   Greenness is measured using the Normalized 
Difference Vegetation Index (“NDVI”), an index of the level of photosynthesis 
occurring in plants calculated from satellite imaging.  NDVI is a dimensionless index 
that ranges from -1 (low photosynthetic activity) to 1 (vigorous photosynthetic 
activity).  It has been used in many applications, including crop productivity, forage 
 
3 This definition follows from the literature on ranchettes, which uses a size classification based on 
recommendations from assessors and realtors.  Tax and zoning classifications for ranchettes tend to be diverse and 
unreliable (Sengupta & Osgood, 2003). 
Dt
Dp
{ } { } { } { } { }( ), , ,i i i i i iDuration f mortgage owner property owner property= ´
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estimation, and malaria prediction.4  Bi-weekly global NDVI data are available at 1 
km resolution5 from 1981 to the present in a standardized form (Tucker et al., 2004). 
NDVI data were matched to parcels in the dataset based on the location of the parcel 
centroid. 
 
Four greenness statistics are calculated for each observation: (1) the mean of 
NDVI over the entire history of NDVI for the property in question (“NDVI historic 
mean”); (2) the variance of NDVI over the entire history of NDVI for the property 
(“NDVI historic variance”); (3) the deviation of the mean of NDVI during the period 
between the sales from the NDVI historic mean (“NDVI owner-observed deviation”); 
and (4) the variance of NDVI during the period between the sales (“NDVI owner-
observed variance”).  These statistics are incorporated as regressors, both 
independently and interacted with a dummy variable reflecting whether the owner is 
from out of state, yielding eight greenness variables in all.6  Our key explanatory 
variable consists of owner out-of-state status interacted with NDVI owner-observed 
deviation.  This variable represents the effect on holding time by an out-of-state owner 
of observed greenness in excess of that expected for the parcel based on historic 
climate data.  Based on our hypothesis, we expect the coefficient on this variable to be 
positive.  The remaining seven greenness variables are included as controls.  The out-
of-state owner dummy is also included independently as a control variable. 
 
Control variables are also included that capture additional characteristics of the 
property.  We incorporate the following “permanent” land characteristics: number of 
acres in the parcel; elevation of the parcel centroid (in meters); distance from the 
parcel centroid to the nearest road, river, and major city (in kilometers); and adjacency 
of the parcel to publicly owned land (dummy variable).  Data on elevation and the 
locations of roads, rivers, cities and public land were obtained from the Arizona 
Regional Image Archive.  We also control for the existence of improvements to the 
property or, alternatively, the assessed value of improvements.  Improvements consist 
of assessed structures, such as houses or barns, or other developed features of the 
property, such as a driveway or corral.  It is hypothesized that improved properties are 
likely to be held longer, because they are likely to have a resident owner or tenant and 
are therefore less likely to be held simply for speculative purposes.7   
 
4 See, e.g., Nivens et al. (2002). 
5 This is a useful level of resolution for attenuating endogeneity accruing to potential manipulation of NDVI by 
individual ranchette owners.  A individual ranchette-sized parcel is miniscule compared to a 1 km pixel. 
6 Out-of-state status for the owner is based on the mailing address given when the parcel was originally purchased.  
This methodology attempts to elicit the owner’s residence prior to buying (and potentially occupying) a property in 
Yavapai County. 
7 Typically, regressions on amenity value in real estate are performed on single family homes, controlling for 
characteristics of the home with a multitude of descriptive variables (e.g., number of bedrooms, etc.).  We take a 
different approach here, accounting only for the value or existence of improvements.  Approximately two-thirds of 
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Finally, we also incorporate as explanatory variables corresponding to each 
sales pair the mortgage rate at the date of the second sale and the change in mortgage 
rate relative to the date of the first sale.  It is hypothesized that duration of ownership 
will vary positively with the former and negatively with the latter.  That is, owners 
will delay sale of their properties when mortgage rates are high or are falling; 
conversely, they will sell sooner when rates are low or are rising.  Monthly data for 
mortgage rates were obtained from Freddie Mac;8 the rates correspond to conforming 
30-year fixed-rate mortgages. 
 
Ordinary least squares regression was used.  Three different models were 
estimated, representing variations in the methodology used for incorporating parcel 
improvements: the first incorporates the value of improvements, the second includes 
both the value and the square of the value of improvements, and the third incorporates 
only a dummy variable indicating the presence of improvements. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The regression results are displayed in Table 1.  Summary statistics for the 
sample data are presented in Table 2.  The key explanatory variable, owner out-of-
state status interacted with NDVI owner-observed deviation, is significant at the 5% 
critical level in all three specifications.  It has the positive sign predicted, consistent 
with our hypothesis.  Mortgage rate and change in mortgage rate are strongly 
significant in their impact on the duration of ownership, also with the signs predicted.  
In addition, as expected, properties with improvements are more likely to have longer 
durations of ownership, as indicated by positive coefficients on the value of 
improvements in the first two regressions and on the improvements dummy in the 
third.  The results in the second regression suggest that improvements of greater value 
may increase the duration of ownership, but to a decreasing extent as value increases. 
 
the parcels in the sample have no improvements at all, hence most of our exogenous variation arises from features of 
the land rather than improvement characteristics. 
8 Available at http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/pmms30.htm.  
 Mountain Plains Journal of Business and Economics, Volume 7, 2006 
10 
 
 
Focusing on the result with respect to our key explanatory variable, let us 
consider whether there are plausible alternatives to the lemons “mirage” explanation 
that are consistent with rational behavior.  If out-of-state owners simply had stronger 
tastes for greenness than other people, one might expect them to hold green properties 
longer.  But this effect would be reflected in the variable that interacts out-of-state 
status with the NDVI historic mean.  On that variable, we observe only very weak 
significance in the first regression specification, and no significance in the other two 
specifications.  The outcome with respect to our key explanatory variable implies, 
rather, that the out-of-state owner perceives additional value in the deviation of her 
property’s greenness from its historic mean. 
 
What could be the source of this value?  Perhaps it is the expectation that 
deviating properties will remain atypically green into the future, in other words, that 
greenness is serially correlated.9  But if this were true, everyone, including potential 
buyers, would know it, so the only reason for a longer holding time for out-of-staters 
would be if, again, greenness represented a greater amenity for them than other 
people.  As discussed above, the evidence for this is weak at best.  We are left with 
 
9 There is evidence of serial correlation in rainfall, at least for some regions of the world, in that meteorologists have 
been able to predict seasonal and annual rainfall variations.  See, e.g., Yu et al. (1997) and White (2000).  
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Mortgage rate 48.96*** (9.08) 48.82*** (9.07) 48.95*** (9.13)
Change in mortgage rate -40.44*** (-12.36) -40.15*** (-12.28) -40.08*** (-12.32)
NDVI historic mean -0.385 (-1.38) -0.339 (-1.21) -0.401 (-1.44)
NDVI historic variance 22.36 (0.54) 24.10 (0.59) 24.55 (0.60)
NDVI owner-obs deviation -2.718 (-1.44) -2.694 (-1.43) -2.761 (-1.47)
NDVI owner-obs variance 18.46 (0.84) 19.03 (0.87) 19.14 (0.88)
Non-AZ owner -0.0072 (-0.03) 0.030 (0.13) 0.020 (0.09)
Non-AZ owner · NDVI historic mean 1.045* (1.66) 0.936 (1.48) 1.029 (1.64)
Non-AZ owner · NDVI historic variance -43.72 (-0.57) -47.94 (-0.63) -52.01 (-0.68)
Non-AZ owner · NDVI owner-obs deviation 7.809** (2.09) 7.787** (2.09) 7.765** (2.09)
Non-AZ owner · NDVI owner-obs variance -28.55 (-0.73) -23.79 (-0.61) -24.35 (-0.62)
Number of acres 0.00089 (0.26) 0.0013 (0.39) 0.0017 (0.50)
Elevation 0.000026 (0.31) 0.000023 (0.29) 0.000040 (0.49)
Distance to road 0.0098 (1.28) 0.010 (1.35) 0.010 (1.37)
Distance to river -0.0039 (-0.79) -0.0042 (-0.85) -0.0044 (-0.90)
Distance to major city -0.00099 (-0.50) -0.00088 (-0.45) -0.00098 (-0.50)
Adjacent to public land -0.022 (-0.39) -0.019 (-0.34) -0.011 (-0.19)
Value of improvements ($000) 0.00098*** (2.69) 0.0022*** (2.80)
Value of improvements squared -0.000006* (-1.77)
Improvements dummy 0.186*** (3.93)
Constant 2.955*** (6.67) 2.930*** (6.62) 2.892*** (6.56)
R-squared 0.2133 0.2170 0.2226
***,**, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
(3)
Table 1
Regression results: log (duration of ownership),  N=694
(1) (2)
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the best explanation being that out-of-state owners erroneously interpret discrepancies 
between their own observations and public perceptions of greenness as reflecting an 
information asymmetry. 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has shown that the tendency of ranchette owners to rely on direct 
observational evidence in assessing property greenness leads to a lemon’s outcome.  
The greener their properties appear during the period of ownership, holding historic 
greenness constant, the longer out-of-state owners delay selling them.  Since 
properties that appear green to their owners are falsely interpreted as atypically green, 
the decision not to sell sooner is suboptimal.  The owner would be better off relying 
only on publicly available climate data and not placing any weight on her direct 
observations. 
 
The observed behavior is cause for concern from a market efficiency 
standpoint.  Whereas in markets with asymmetric information the bad may drive out 
the good, we find that under full information the apparently bad might nevertheless 
drive out the apparently good.  Transactions that are delayed or that do not occur as a 
result of sellers’ judgmental errors represent lost welfare, as opportunities are missed 
Mean Standard Dev. Minimum Maximum
Log duration of ownership (days) 6.864 (0.637) 4.511 8.070
Mortgage rate 0.076 (0.006) 0.067 0.092
Change in mortgage rate -0.0027 (0.0092) -0.0259 0.0232
NDVI historic mean 0.308 (0.094) 0.200 0.609
NDVI historic variance 0.0027 (0.0009) 0.0013 0.0052
NDVI owner-obs deviation -0.0032 (0.014) -0.0714 0.0524
NDVI owner-obs variance 0.0028 (0.0015) 0.0004 0.0142
Non-AZ owner 0.245 (0.430) 0 1
Non-AZ owner · NDVI historic mean 0.073 (0.135) 0 0.573
Non-AZ owner · NDVI historic variance 0.0006 (0.0012) 0 0.0046
Non-AZ owner · NDVI owner-obs deviation -0.0008 (0.0071) -0.0551 0.0348
Non-AZ owner · NDVI owner-obs variance 0.0007 (0.0014) 0 0.0098
Number of acres 7.100 (7.994) 2.001 39.999
Elevation (meters) 1413.36 (282.69) 609 2355
Distance to road (km) 2.0010 (3.5178) 0.0002 30.6897
Distance to river (km) 5.9368 (5.9052) 0.0019 34.4685
Distance to major city (km) 9.1325 (16.0806) 0.0007 76.0575
Adjacent to public land 0.203 0.402 0 1
Value of improvements ($000) 31.625 (61.004) 0 403.186
Value of improvements squared 4716.3 (15085.6) 0 162559
Improvements dummy 0.336 (0.473) 0 1
Table 2
Summary Statistics
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for exploiting gains from trade. The extent to which this happens depends upon the 
share of sellers whose judgments are biased by direct observation.  In the present 
analysis, the affected sellers were out-of-staters, who represented roughly 24% of the 
transactions in our sample. 
 
A likely factor in ranchette owners’ substitution of direct observation for more 
reliable public data is that owners believe it is possible to develop an informational 
advantage over buyers.  Thus, our observed lemons problem depends upon there being 
some uncertainty about the existence of quality certainty.  This suggests that the 
institutions discussed by Akerlof (1970) – quality guarantees, brand names, licensing 
and certification – can help counteract not only the conventional lemons problem, but 
also the type of derivative lemons problem examined here.  For example, the relevant 
climatic characteristics of a ranchette could be certified by a qualified (and potentially 
licensed) professional as part of the property survey or a pre-sale inspection.  Out-of-
state owners’ perceptions that they have superior knowledge of property greenness 
might thereby be minimized and associated selling delays and welfare losses might be 
reduced or eliminated. 
 
The results have important implications for real estate markets in the mountain 
west region.  In our empirical analysis, the tendency of property owners to rely on 
directly observed evidence of greenness only had implications for the sale timing of 
transplant owners, since only their direct observations diverged from the long-term 
climate data.  This divergence, we suggested, had to do essentially with lack of 
familiarity with the local region and its climate.  Given the large presence of recent in-
migrants in the mountain west, many people buying and selling real estate in the 
region lack familiarity with it.  Thus, generally speaking, it seems inappropriate to 
model regional transactions with “fully rational” buyers and sellers.  Dynamic models 
incorporating learning and experience may provide more accurate depictions of 
behavior in the region.  Though the gullibility of newcomers to the West in matters of 
real estate is legendary and has the status of an old joke, it should, in practical ways, 
be incorporated more systematically into research analysis. 
 
Further work seems indicated.  In the empirical analysis, we tested for adverse 
selection, essentially taking as given, based on general psychological research results, 
that owners assess property greenness from direct observation.  The notion that buyers 
and sellers in real estate markets rely heavily on direct observational evidence should 
be tested explicitly.  In addition, the welfare implications of the lemon’s mirage, 
discussed conceptually earlier in this concluding section, should be modeled 
rigorously. 
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